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DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN RELIGIONS:
SOME THOUGHTS ON READING
GREENAWALT'S RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND
FAIRNESS
John Finnis*

Suppose the core teachings of a religion with a significant
number of followers inside and outside the United States entail
that significant parts of the United States Constitution, including
the free exercise and establishment clauses of the First Amendment, ought to be replaced either by peaceful processes such as
voting or, if need be, by threats and use of force, and that governance of the United States, or of such regions, big or small, as
can be brought under the religion's sway, ought to be entrusted
to its followers. Would it be constitutional for Congress to forbid
the entry to the United States of members of that religion un1
willing to make a public declaration renouncing that teaching?
Should it be? I raise these questions as a kind of test of the thesis
prominent in Kent Greenawalt's fine book, that both of the religion clauses "forbid discrimination among religions" (p. 13)
(emphasis in original), and that "[ o ]ne of the most powerful
principles of the religion clauses is that the government may not
favor some religions at the expense of others" (p. 212).
You may say: Please, let's just stay in the real world. And
spare us the embarrassment of trolling through other people's
* Biolchini Family Professor of Law. University of Notre Dame and Professor of
Law and Legal Philosophy. University of Oxford.
1. A low-key version of this might be section 2 of the bill for a Jihad Prevention
Act. introduced on September 18. 2008. by Rep. Tom Tancredo as H. R. 6975. which provides. in the relevant part. that "[a]ny alien who fails to attest. in accordance with procedures specified by the Secretary of Homeland Securitv. that the alien will not advocate
installing a Sharia law system in the United States is in~dmissible." Jihad Prevention Act.
H.R. 6975. 110th Cong. § 2 (2008). m·ailab/e at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
z?c110:H.R.6975. This is "low-key" because of the stringently narrow meaning ascribed
to "advocate" in Yates v. United States. 354 U.S. 298.324-25 (1957). overruled on other
grounds by Burks v. United States. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
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faith. especially when this faith's adherents are so typically decent. loyal Americans, and stand with us against secularist degradations of human life and family. Haven't you heard of bigotry? And I grant that the United States is so big and so unlikely
to be threatened, as a whole, by any set of persons who would
have to immigrate by ships and planes that it seems plausible to
dismiss the hypothesis, or treat it as an occasion for renewed satisfaction that the Constitution compels us to live with the healthy
risks of freedom, non-establishment, etc. Not every community.
however, is so fortunately placed. You should regard these reflections as an attempt to transpose to the American context. so
meticulously explored by Greenawalt, a contemporary problem
that elsewhere is very real, transcends bigotry, and calls on responsible people to set aside their feelings of embarrassment.
And it is, in any case, worth testing the intuition enshrined in
Greenawalt's title, that non-establishment and fairness go hand
in hand, the former required by the latter.
To establish the realism of at least part of the hypothesisthe part which postulates the existence of a religion of the outlined kind- and to disestablish the imputations of embarrassing
bigotry, I will take a short-cut. Since nowadays, I'm told, only
rank conservatives object to citation of foreign cases in constitutional matters, I call in aid the recent unanimous judgment of
seventeen judges of the European Court of Human Rights in
Refah Partisi v. Turkey:
[T]he Court considers that sharia, which faithfully reflects the
dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, is stable and
invariable. Principles such as pluralism in the political sphere
or the constant evolution of public freedoms have no place in
it. ... [A] regime based on sharia ... clearly diverges from
Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law
and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women
and the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public
life in accordance with religious precepts. . . . [A] political
party whose actions seem to be aimed at introducing
sharia ... can hardly be regarded as an association complying
with the democratic ideal that underlies the whole of the
Convention.'

On that basis it upheld the Turkish Supreme Court's dissolution
of Turkey's elected Government and of the country's main
2. Refah Partisi v. Turkey. 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1. § 123 (2003) (emphasis added)
(upholding and adopting the language of the Third Section of the European Court of
Human Rights in Refah Partisi v. Turkey. 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3. § 72 (2002).
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party, on the grounds that the Government in which that party
was dominant was preparing-or might well be preparing. and
there is no obligation to wait until the last moment to be sure of
such intentions- to introduce shari a either as law applicable to
all or as part of a scheme in which all citizens would be subjected
to the law of their respective religion.
If it is hard for contemporary American constitutionalists to
take this sort of "militant democracy" -pre-emptive defense of
democracy-at all seriously. it is even harder to get them to do
so when it involves steadily focusing on the possibility that a particular religion- the private faith of fellow citizens or of hard-up
immigrants-might be different from all other religions in its
core beliefs about the Constitution, and about the legitimacy of
long-term deception 3 and intimidation in the cause of overthrowing it or, much more immediately. in the cause of rendering certain constitutional guarantees inapplicable within the religion's
zone of dominance. And. Greenawalt's new book's commentary
on these matters is rather oblique. In persuasively defending the
pre-Smith balancing test for religious claims to exemption from
generally applicable prohibitions, against Eisgruber and Sager's
thesis that claims of religious exercise should enjoy constitutional protection if and only if non-exemption (failure to accommodate) would manifest a discriminatory legislative "failure
of equal regard," Greenawalt takes a critical look at their suggestion (as he paraphrases it) that "[i ]f legislatures or administrators fairly considered the imposition on members of minority
religions of a uniform dress code, they would have made excep4
tions." (p. 475). He comments that this overlooks a significant
complexity: "It might be that the reason not to make a particular
exception-say for girls in school wearing head scarves-is that
usage reflects and conveys (for some people) a prescribed role

3. It was part of Turkey's case before the European Court of Human Rights that
(in the Court's past-tense paraphrase) ··[i]n order to attain its ultimate goal of replacing
the existing legal order with sharia. political Islam used the method known as rakivve.
which consisted in hiding its beliefs until it had attained that goat·· Refah Partisi. 35 E.ur.
H.R. Rep. 3. § 59. The Court did not make any finding about Islamic takiyve (a practice
which had not been denied by the applicant members of the dissolved government and
party). but observed more broadly that political parties and movements may conceal
their aims and profess their adherence to democracv and the rule of law until it is too late
to prevent them overthrowing both. Refah Parrisi. 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3. §* -IK HO: Refah
Parrisi. 37 Eur. H.R. Rep.
101.
·
-1. Eisgruber and Sager might protest that this absolutizes their claim. quoted by
Greenawalt in the preceding sentence. that equal liberty .. will call for exemptions in most
dress code cases·· (p. 475) (emphasis added).

I.*
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for women that does not correspond to liberal democratic values." (p. 475) (emphasis in original).
Greenawalt's point is a fair one. But his dialectic with Eisgruber and Sager does not require or even allow him to reach
the issues I am considering: (1) What if the prohibition were
aimed precisely at a practice demanded or encouraged by a particular religion. because it is demanded or encouraged by that religion as part of a unitary package of tenets of that religion which
as a package is opposed to the Constitution? Or again: (2) What if
the prohibition were aimed precisely at a practice demanded or
encouraged by a particular religion, because it is often imposed
on members of that religion by (a) unlawful intimidation, or
(b) unjustified pressure, otherwise impossible to combat effectively?
Or again, to get a bit closer to the immigration issue: (3)
What if the prohibition were in the context of state aid, e.g.
vouchers available for schools including religious schools, provided that they undertake neither to advocate nor to teach the
desirability of introducing sharia law into the United States?
Greenawalt's discussions of the conditions that states may impose on the ideas that schools receiving aid may teach are,
doubtless necessarily, somewhat inconclusive. "[C]ertain [legislative] judgments about good and bad values would be constitutionally foreclosed as criteria for a state providing aid," but
"[ c]ourts will permit states to set some conditions ... as Ohio required that schools receiving voucher money in Cleveland [in
Zelman v Simmons-Harris'] not teach hatred of groups classified
by race, religion, or ethnic background.'' (p. 459). On the other
hand, he notes that "Justice Souter amply demonstrates that the
rule against teaching hatred of groups is fuzzy enough at the
edges. so that it might be understood to cover teaching of vari6
ous ideas that are embraced by many religious groups" (p. 418).
Still, Greenawalt does not seem to draw Souter's definite conclusion that any state aid to religious schools threatens religious liberty and equality amongst religions (or entangles the state in discrimination between religions). The book's treatment, at this
point, lacks the absolutism foreshadowed by its early (p. 13) acceptance of the sponsorship of Justice Brennan in Larson v.

5. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
6. Citing Zelman. 536 U.S. at 713-14: see alsop. 416. where Greenawalt suggests a
list of other religious (Catholic and Protestant-conspicuously not Islamic) beliefs that
might be regarded as hatred of others.
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Valent/ for a near-absolutist rule of non-discrimination amongst
religions. Against Noah Feldman's argument that a decisive reason for avoiding or outlawing state aid is that the constitutional
rule of neutrality, applied to such aid, would entail permitting
the beneficiaries to (both take the money and) teach e.g. "antiAmericanism, or sexism," Greenawalt objects (pp. 459, 469):
"Although a state cannot discriminate on the basis of theological
propositions of a religion, it may be able to require that a
school's ethical and political teachings be not wholly at odds with
premises of our liberal democracy." (p. 470).x
Here a central underlying issue comes into view. What if the
"theological propositions of a religion" include political teachings "wholly at odds with premises of our liberal democracy" or,
to speak like the European Court of Human Rights, ''with the
democratic ideal that underlies the whole of the [Constitution]"
or, to speak I think more suitably, with the Constitution and
other principles that we have taken as foundational for our law?
The matter is, I guess, not settled by cases declaring that
"The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time to these shores."~ Such sweeping declarations are qualified even by those who, like the majority in
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 111 recite them in the context
of a rights-articulating provision such as the Fourth Amendment.
The declarations, like the result in Verugo-Urquidez, were rejected by the same Justice Brennan who authored Larson v.
Valente. It is easy to envisage judges of Brennan's
(Greenawalt's?) persuasion jumping off from the absoluteness of
the prohibition: "shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion." No need (the argument might run) to predicate a
correlative right in aliens abroad; many citizen members of the
"dis-established" religion might be deemed to have standing to
challenge its discriminatory, "other-religions-establishing" restriction on their opportunity to be joined by co-religionists
7. Larson v. Valente. 456 U.S. 228 (19R2).
8. Greenawalt adds. to me somewhat obscurelv: ··If the only concern is about discrimination. the inquiry should be whether state restiictions on fo~ms of teaching constitute some kind of discrimination. Presumably more would need to be shown than that
some religious groups actually do want to e~gage in the kind of teaching that is disallowed." (p. 470). Then he adds. to me more intelligibly: "[H]owever. the concern here
goes beyond discrimination to whether the government impedes religious liberty by setting up standards for instruction about morals and politics with which religious groups
wanting state assistance for their schools must comply ... (p. 470).
9. Bridges v. Wixson. 326 U.S. 135. 161 (1945) (Murphy. 1.. concurring). Also
quoted in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. 494 U.S. 259. 271 (1990).
10. Verdugo- Urquidez. 494 U.S. 259.

270

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 25:265

(family-members. imams, etc.) from abroad. Other absolutist
pronouncements of the Court would be called in aid, such as Justice Kennedy's statement in the Lukumi case that:
[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible,
if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices
because of their religious motivation. the law is not neutral,
and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest
11
and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.

Would ending immigration by Muslims, or by Muslims who will
not publicly renounce sharia for America, be "targeting their beliefs as such"? Would it be "to infringe upon or restrict their
practices because of their religious motivation"? The categories
creak. But one can readily foresee the first part of Justice Kennedy's loosely constructed sentence being pressed into service.
To be sure. Greenawalt nowhere opts for absoluteness, but
instead for a non-discrimination demand that is defeasible in
principle. It's a matter of strict scrutiny, scrutiny seeking a compelling state interest. Strict scrutiny in religious liberty cases has
proved "feeble." But in religious discrimination cases it has hitherto been strict enough to be uniformly fatal, 12 absent historic
practices such as legislative prayers (anomalies bitterly repudiated by the Brennan absolutists).
To conclude this provocation: Because numbers-critical
masses-matter. times change. A legislature looking forward
from now, or fairly soon, might responsibly decide that the only
likely medium-term constructive alternative to forbidding immigration by persons unwilling to renounce their religion's core
theologico-political and numbers-dependent drive to impose political and legal domination will foreseeably prove to be the statepromoted introduction-as is beginning to be ventured in
France, Germany and the U.K.-of an emasculated version of
Islam. supervised by state instrumentalities responsible for selecting the teachers and preachers of that highly distinctive religion in the hope of watering down its inbuilt focus on domination,
violence and submission, its division of the world into the world
of Islam and the world of war, its public and private subjection
of women. and other features that (so the legislature might
judge) make it at best inassimilable and at worst a clear and
11. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. Inc. v. City of Hialeah. 508 U.S. 520. 533
(1993) (citations omitted).
12. Adam Winkler. Fatal in Theon• and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Stricr Scrutinv in the Federal Courts. 59 VAND. L. REV. 793.860--62 (2006).
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mounting danger. If the latter alternative (State-sponsored Islam) is to be judged permanently unavailable here, because a
plain "establishment of religion," still the resort to it by centrist
European governments might go some way towards (a) showing
a compelling state interest in not leaving this religion and its followers to their own devices, and thus (b) surmounting the bar
raised by the beguiling but curious doctrine that discrimination
against one religion is (as Greenawalt seems implicitly to contend) not only unfair but also an establishment of all the others
(and of irreligion?).

